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NOTES AND COMMENT
SOME ASPECTS OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION GOVERNING THE
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH IN NEW YORK

Under the common law of the Anglo-American jurisdictions the
death of a human being as the result of the tortious act of another
was not an injury that could be the subject of complaint in civil
courts.' Moreover the civil action for damages which the decedent
could have otherwise maintained abated because death resulted from
the personal injuries suffered.2 In effect the rules thus stated rendered the tortfeasor immune from civil liability for the ultimate consequences of his wrongful act while subjecting the decedent's family
to unrecompensed deprivation of services and earnings. Those patently harsh and unjust common law principles governed the wrongful
death problem for many centuries.
In 1846 the first cause of action for wrongful death was created
in England.3 It is to be noted that the remedy did not arise through
decisional evolution but rather by means of legislative enactment.
The statutory nature of the cause of action has prompted considerable juridical
diminution of its effectiveness through strict con4
struction.
On the thirteenth day of December, 1847, the Legislature of
the State of New York created a similar cause of action for wrongful
death. 5 Several important changes have been made with regard to
the New York death statutes during the past century. In 1880 the
statutes were incorporated into the Code of Civil Procedure. 6 The
New York State Constitution was revised in 1896 at which time a

provision was included therein which guaranteed that the cause of
action for wrongful death would not be abrogated nor would the
amount of damages recoverable in such actions be subject to statutory
limitation. 7 The more simplified Civil Practice Act was substituted

See Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). For an
interesting critique of the common rule, see 3 HLDSWORTH, A HIsTORY
OF ENGLIsH LAW 333-336 (1934).
2 See PROSsEP, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 954-961 (1941).

3 Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 8 & 10 VIcr. c. 93 (also termed the "Fatal
Accidents Act").
4 As a general rule statutes deemed to be in derogation of the common law
are strictly construed.

See 3

SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN

§§ 5301-

5305 (3d ed. 1943) for a treatment of the various aspects of the strict construction rule.
56 Laws of N. Y. 1847, c. 450.
N. Y. CODE CrV. PROC. §§ 1902-1904.
7 N. Y. CoxsT. Art. I, § 15 (1896)-presently located in Art. I, § 16.
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for the Code of Civil Procedure in 1920.8 When this change was
made many sections of the old Code were transferred to other statutory headings in the consolidated laws of New York.9 The death
statutes were then shifted to their present location-the Decedent
Estate Law. 10
Briefly, the New York wrongful death statutes permit the personal representative of the deceased to maintain an action for damages
in behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin against a natural
person, or corporation, who would have been liable to the decedent
for personal injuries occasioned within the state by the defendant's
wrongful act, neglect or default, had death not ensued." On the
trial of such an action the statutory burden is placed upon the defendant to plead and prove the decedent's contributory negligence if
such defense is available.' 2 The time limitation for the commencement of the action is two years from the death of the decedent.' 8
The damages recoverable are in the nature of compensation to the
surviving spouse and next of kin for the pecuniary loss resulting to
them because of the death.' 4 The section of the law governing the
damages recoverable permits the recovery of reasonable medical and
funeral expenditures in addition to the approximated pecuniary loss.1
However, excessive damages may not be awarded.' 6 The interest
7
on the judgment runs from the date of the decedent's death.'
In addition to the action for wrongful death the personal representative may also prosecute a statutory action for the personal
injuries sustained by the deceased.18 If the decedent had commenced
the prosecution of such a claim prior to death the action may be continued by the personal representative.' 9 The damages recoverable
under these survival provisions are limited to those accruing before
death.2 0 The maintenance of this action does not preclude the action
8 See PRASHKER, NEW YORK PRAcxcE § 3 (1947).

9For example: The 1913 amendment to § 1780 of the New York Code
of Civil Procedure is currently to be found in New York General Corporation
Law §§ 224, 225. There are many other such examples.
'ON. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 130-134.
'IN. Y. Dec. EsT. LAW § 130. This section presupposes that the right of
action has not been barred by the statute of limitations, or released, or compromised by the decedent or the next of kin. See Fontheim v. Third Ave. Ry.,
257 App. Div. 147, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 90 (1st Dep't 1939), appeal dismissed, 289
N. Y. 624, 43 N. E. 2d 840 (1942); Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F. 2d 353
(C. C. A. 2d 1937).
12 N. Y. Dec. EsT. LAW § 131.
"3N. Y. Dec. EsT. LAW § 130.
'1 N. Y. Dec. EsT. LAW § 132.
Is Ibid.

16 See Somogye v. New York Central Ry., 269 App. Div. 923, 57 N. Y. S.
2d 731 (4th Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N. Y. 790, 66 N. E. 2d 301 (1946).
'7 N. Y. DFc. EsT. LAW § 132.

Is N. Y. DEc. EsT.
19 N. Y. DEc. EsT.
20 Ibid.

LAW
LAW

§§ 118,
§ 120.

120.
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for wrongful death.21 In fact the actions may be consolidated 22 On
the trial of the consolidated actions the personal representative is
relieved from the burden of pleading and proving decedent's freedoma
from contributory negligence even as to the personal injury claim23
Where the two claims are joined the verdicts rendered thereon must
be separate and distinct. 24 The separation of the verdicts is essential
because the damages recovered under the survival statute are deemed
assets of the decedent's estate and are subject to decedent's creditor's
claims, while the damages recovered under the wrongful death statutes are payable for the direct benefit of the surviving spouse and
next of kin and are not subject to the creditor's rights.25 Since 1935
neither the personal injury or wrongful death causes of action, as
prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased, are subject to abatement by reason of the death of the -wrongdoer.26
Thus in form the New York wrongful death statutes appear to
afford adequate relief from the intolerable common law rules. However, the outward appearance of statutes should be considered in the
light of judicial interpretations placed thereon. It is from those considerations that the full effect of the statutory enactments may be
determined.
Limitations of space preclude a detailed consideration of the
manifold provisions of the New York wrongful death statutes. A
fair indication of the manner of judicial interpretation and its effect
upon the remedial nature of the statutory cause of action may be
obtained through an analysis of one of its more important and controversial requirements. With that thought in mind the two-year
period of limitation,27 which governs the availability of the remedy,
has been selected as the subject of analysis here. This requirement
is important because the failure to comply therewith places the surviving spouse and next of kin back under the cloud of the common
law rule unless, perchance, its operation may be tolled or extended
for some good cause. It is controversial because the ever-evolving
judicial interpretation of the two-year limitation is, in some important respects, still unsettled and uncertain.
An analysis of the nature and effect of the limitation as to the
period of time within which the statutory action for wrongful death
must be commenced necessarily involves the consideration of some
collateral factors. For example, it is to be remembered that the construction given to the periods of limitation controlling the death statutes of other jurisdictions have little weight in construing the com-

21 See N. Y. DEc. EsT.,LAW § 120.
22N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 120.
23 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 131.
24
N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 120.
25
N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW §§ 120, 130.
28 See N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW §§ 118, 119.
27 See N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 130.
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parable statutory period governing the right of action in New York
as interpreted, most genbecause the foreign statutory provisions,
28
It is to be noted also that
erally differ in content and substance.
New York death statutes begin
the period of limitation governing the
to run from the decedent's death 29 though it has been frequently
stated that the cause of action does not accrue until the letters testamentary of the decedent's personal representative have been
granted.3 0 This is not an anomaly. The personal representative,
though nominal, is a necessary party to the action. 31 Thus, while
the right of action vests upon death,3 2 it may be prosecuted only by
the personal representative of the decedent and that party cannot
representative capacity until letters testamentary have been
act in the
33
issued.
For many years the courts of New York held the conviction that
the two-year period of limitation governing the commencement of
the action for wrongful death was something more than a mere statute of limitations. The bases of that conviction were twofold; first,
the death statute was considered to be in derogation of the common
law and hence must be strictly limited to effectuate only its express
terms; 84 and secondly, the express terms of the original statute
granted the right of action upon the proviso that the action should
be commenced within two years from the decedent's death.3 5 Consequently, the courts in construing the provision foutd that compliance therewith was in the nature of a condition precedent to the right

28

See Note, 132 A. L. R. 292 (1940).

29 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 130; Cohen v. Steigman, 249 App. Div. 819,

292 N. Y. Supp. 750 (2d Dep't 1937).
30 Crapo v. Syracuse, 183 N. Y. 395, 76 N. E. 465 (1906); Barnes v.
Brooklyn,
22 App. Div. 520, 48 N. Y. Supp. 36 (2d Dep't 1897).
31
Rice v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 174 App. Div. 39, 160 N. Y. Supp.
172 (4th Dep't 1916), aff'd mem, 219 N. Y. 629, 114 N. E. 1081 (1916);

Davis v. N. Y. C. & H. Ry., 233 N. Y. 242, 135 N. E. 277 (1922).
Note: Under New York Decedent Estate Law § 130, by express provision, a foreign administrator can bring an action for wrongful death without
first32procuring ancillary letters of administration.
Matter of Meekin v. B. H. Ry., 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50 (1900);
Matter
of Brennan, 160 App. Div. 401, 145 N. Y. Supp. 549 (3d Dep't 1914).
33
See Boffe v. Consolidated Telegraph & El. Subway Co., 171 App. Div.
392, 157 N. Y. Supp. 318 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd men., 226 N. Y. 654, 123
N. E. 856 (1919).
Failure to procure the necessary letters testamentary is not correctable by a

nunc pro tunc order. Smith v. New York Central R. R., 183 App. Div. 478,
171 N. Y. Supp. 64 (2d Dep't 1918). The federal rule is contra. See McCarthy
v. New York Central R. R., 247 App. Div. 50, 286 N. Y. Supp. 598 (1st Dep't
1936).
34 This is in keeping with general construction principles adhered to by
the courts, namely, that which did not evolve out of the sanctimonious common3 law past was to be viewed with suspicion.

5Laws of N. Y. 1847, c. 450.

1948 ]

NOTES AND COMMENT

of action.36 There are no cases in point which construe the precise
terminology of the original statute. However, several rather interesting cases adopted the condition precedent view by way of obiter
dicta.37 When the death statute was incorporated into the Code of
Civil Procedure in 1880 the wording of the limitation provision was
changed from, ". . . provided that every such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such deceased person," 3 8
to, "such action must be commenced within two years after decedent's death." 39 The foregoing change in terminology did not immediately cause the New York courts to change their conviction as
to the nature of the limitation. The courts construing the new provision were apparently influenced by the dicta which had established
the condition precedent view towards the original limitation proviso.
In Pernisiv. Schmalz Sons, Inc.,40 wherein the new terminology was
construed, it was held that the two-year period was a limitation upon
the remedy and upon the right of action. Similarly, the federal circuit court construing the New York death statute in Kavanaugh v.
Folsom,41 reached the conclusion that the limitation affected the right
and the remedy with the net result that the complaint in the wrongful
death action must allege that the suit is brought within the two-year
period else a demurrer would lie on the ground that no cause of
action was stated.
It is significant that the New York cases following the condition precedent view were all decided in lower appellate courts and
that the Court of Appeals never squarely approved the position taken
in those courts.. However, the condition precedent view has been
adopted, and is still followed, in an overwhelming majority of the
American jurisdictions. 42 In some of the states the peculiar terminology of the respective limitational provisions fairly sustains the
majority position.48 In most jurisdictions the majority view is upheld on the theory that statutes in derogation of the common law
must be strictly construed. 44 A few states adopt the contrary position.45 The minority view concedes that a wrongful death statute
is essentially remedial in nature and should be liberally construed. 40
36 Pernisi v. Schmalz' Sons, Inc., 142 App. Div. 53, 126 N. Y. Supp. 880
(2d3 Dep't 1910); Kavanaugh v. Folsom, 181 Fed. 401 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).

7See Williams v. Quebec S. S. Co., 126 Fed. 591 (S. D. N. Y. 1903);
Cavanaugh v. Ocean Steam Nay. Co., 13 N. Y. Supp. 540 (Sup. Ct. 1890not 38officially reported).
Laws of N. Y. 1847, c. 450.
3
9 N. Y. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1902.
40 142 App. Div. 53, 126 N. Y. Supp. 880 (2d Dep't 1910).
41181 Fed. 401 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
42 See Note, 132 A. L. P, 292 (1940).
43 Id. at 295.
4 Ibid.
45 See Note, 132 A. L. R. 292, 305 (1940).
46 Ibid.
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If an allegation that the action for wrongful death is commenced
within the statutory period limited thereon is treated as a condition
precedent to the defendant's liability the failure to so allege renders
the complaint demurrable on the ground that a cause of action is
not stated. 47 It would seem to follow that unless an express tolling
or saving provision is included in the death statute an invalid allegation of compliance with the period of limitation would in like manver
render the complaint demurrable. A death statute which contains
express tolling or saving provisions would be exceptional indeed.
Most general statutes of limitations, on the other hand, permit a
tolling or extension where the plaintiff is unable to commence his
action within the time limited thereon because of some act or omission on the part of the defendant, or because of some personal incapacity or disability of the plaintiff. 48 General statutes of limitation
affect the remedy, but do not bar the right of action, 49 therefore such
statutes may be waived by the defendant even where an extension
or saving provision would be inapplicable. 50 Where the period of
time is treated as a limitation upon the right of action as well as
upon the remedy it would seem that the express or implied exceptions
of the general statutes of limitations could afford no relief.51 Similarly a waiver of such a limitation would appear to be a nullity. Consequently most of the jurisdictions which adhere to the condition
precedent doctrine refuse to imply exceptions to the time requirements and hold the express and implied exceptions to the general
statutes of limitations inapplicable to death actions. 5 2 Some of the
states which are espoused to the doctrine that compliance with the
time limitational requirements constitutes a condition precedent to
the defendant's liability have nevertheless implemented their death
statutes with some implied exceptions to the general statute of limitations. 53 In those states there is partial recognition of the arbitrary
effect of the majority view.
As previously indicated the lower appellate courts in New York
strictly adhered to the condition precedent doctrine for many years.
In 1915 the problem was finally placed before the Court of Appeals
in Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd.54 In that case the defendant had
demurred to the complaint in the wrongful death action upon the
ground that a cause of action was not stated because the complaint
contained no allegation that the action had been commenced within
See note 36 supra.
For a general treatment of this subject, see PRASHKER, NEW YORKc PRACTicK §§ 34-40 (1947).
49 See 2 CARMODY, NEw YORK PRACTICE § 400 (Perm. ed. 1930).
50
For a general treatment of waiver, see PRASHKER, NEW YORK PRACTICE
§§32, 33 (1947).
51
52 See Note, 132 A. L. R. 292, 295, 298 (1940).
Id. at 295.
53 See note 51 supra.
54214 N. Y. 101, 108 N. E. 217 (1915).
47
48
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the two-year period limited thereon. The highest court of the state
held that the two-year period constituted a limitation upon the remedy but not upon the right of action. The demurrer was overruled.
The ratio decidendi of the court is extremely interesting. The history of the action for wrongful death in New York was discussed.
The court placed great weight upon two factors in that historical
development. First, it was pointed out that the right of action had
been considered so important that the people of the state had afforded
it protective constitutional guarantees. 5 This step was deemed indicative of the fact that the death action had ceased to be special and
peculiar in New York. Secondly, the court stressed the fact that
when the death statutes were incorporated into the Code of Civil
Procedure the terminology of the time limitation had been changed
by the legislature from the absolute proviso ". . . that every such
action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such
deceased person," to, "such action must be commenced within two
years after decedent's death." The court felt that such a change in
language was not meaningless or unintentional. It was concluded
that the time provision, as modified, was intended to become a permanent part of the jurisprudence of the state under the general statutory provisions of the Code. It is submitted that the decision is
sound. It is a significant and forward step toward a more liberal
construction of a statute that is essentially remedial in nature. The
case has been cited with favor on many occasions and has never been
criticized or overruled in New York. The transfer of the death
statutes from the Code of Civil Procedure to the Decedent Estate
Law has not operated to affect or impair the holding because the
time limitational provision was transferred without change in
terminology.56
In effect the Sharrow decision stands for the proposition that
the period of limitation governing the wrongful death action in New
York is in the nature of a general statute of limitations.57 Through
the logic of that construction exceptions to the general statute of
limitations have been applied to toll or extend the period limiting the
remedy under the death statutes. While the current tendency is
toward a more liberal construction the decisions concerned with the
applicability of such exceptions clearly indicate the persistence of some
vestigial remnants of the era of strict construction. Therefore a brief
consideration of these exceptions and the judicial interpretations as
to their applicability is essential to a fuller understanding of the construction problem.

55

N. Y. CoNsr. Art. I, § 16.
51See N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW

§

130.

See Streeter v. Graham & N. Co., 263 N. Y. 39, 188 N. E. 150 (1933);
see Note, 132 A. L. R. 292, 306 (1940).
5
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Practically speaking, the exceptions to the general statutes of
limitation partake of a twofold nature. First, there are exceptions
which apply because of some act, event, or omission affecting the
cause of action. Secondly, there are exceptions which apply because
of some personal disability of the plaintiff or defendant. These exceptions will be considered in that general categorical order.
The general statutes of limitations and the exceptions thereto are
to be found in the New York Civil Practice Act. The exceptions
which toll or extend the operation of general statutes of limitations
because of an act, event, or omission affecting the cause of action
are rather numerous. Some of these exceptions have never been construed in connection with the death statute because they are obviously inapplicable. 58 Other such exceptions have been held applicable
to the period of limitation governing the statutory cause of action
for wrongful death. It is interesting to note that under Section 10
of the Civil Practice Act the general limitation provisions and the
exceptions to those provisions are not applicable to situations governed by a statute which contains a special limitation. Judicial construction over a period of years has effected the determination that
Section 10 does not prevent the application of the exceptions to statutory causes of action wherein the special time limitation is not in the
nature of a condition precedent to the right of action. 59 The period
of limitation governing the action for wrongful death is not, under
the Sharrow doctrine, construed as a condition precedent. Thus the
exceptions may be applied to the death statutes. The indicated construction of Section 10 has not been extended to cover exceptions
which arise because of the personal disability of the plaintiff in
wrongful death action. 60
In Kerr v. St. Luke's Hospital,6 Section 17 of the Civil Practice Act was held applicable to extend the period of limitation in an
action for wrongful death. This section permits service of summons
upon the sheriff of the county wherein the defendant resides when
service upon the latter had not been effected. The service upon the
sheriff must be made before the expiration of the two-year period
58 For example:
New York Civil Practice Act § 43, which deals exclusively with real property actions.
59 McKnight v. City of New York, 186 N. Y. 35, 38, 78 N. E. 576 (1906);
Matter of Keys, 241 App. Div. 556, 272 N. Y. Supp. 713 (4th Dep't 1934),
aff'd mer., 266 N. Y. 583, 195 N. E. 210 (1935). See als&Kerr v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 176 Misc. 610, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd mern., 262
App. Div. 822, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 141 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd mern., 287 N. Y. 673,
39 N. E. 2d 291 (1941).
00 Mossip v. F. H. Clement & Co., 256 App. Div. 469, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 592
(4th Dep't 1939), aff'd mere., 283 N. Y. 554. 27 N. E. 2d 278 (1940). But
consider Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corporation, 273 App. Div. 4, 74 N. Y. S. 2d

818 (1st Dep't 1947).

61 176 Misc. 610, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd mmer., 262 App.
Div. 822, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 141 (1st Dep't 1941), affd mere., 287 N. Y. 673,
39 N. E. 2d 291 (1941).
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governing the death action. Such service acts to extend the period
within which service may be made upon the defendant by 60 days
from the expiration date of the normal limitational provisions.
Section 19 of the Civil Practice Act operates to toll the general
statutes of limitations where the defendant is continuously absent
from the state or resides therein under a false name. This section
has not been construed in New York as to its effect upon the period
of limitations encompassed in the death statutes.

Casey v. American Bridge Co.6 2 is a most interesting case treating this problem and it may well serve as a guide to the New York
Courts when the situation is presented. That case involved the construction of the Oklahoma death statutes and practice provisions.
The State of Oklahoma operates under a-general code containing
both the practice and death statutes. The Oklahoma Code is akin
to the old New York Code of Civil Procedure in that respect. The
construction given to the Oklahoma death statute as to its basic
nature is comparable to the doctrine enunciated by the New York
Court of Appeals in the Sharrow case. The Oklahoma Code contains a provision essentially similar to Section 19 of the New York
Civil Practice Act. In this instance the fatal accident occurred in
Oklahoma. Before service could be effected the defendant fled to
Minnesota from whence he did not return. Several years after the
expiration of the two-year period limiting the remedy under the
Oklahoma death statute the decedent's personal representative instituted the death action in Minnesota. The defendant complained that
the action could not be maintained because of the expiration of the
statutory period. The Minnesota court, applying the law of the place
where the accident occurred, determined that under the law of
Oklahoma the period of limitation had been tolled by the defendant's
continued absence from that state and, resultantly, the period limiting
the availability of the remedy had not expired. Thus the action was
held to be maintainable.

Under Section 23 of the New York Civil Practice Act an extension of one year is afforded to recommence suit on causes of action
which have been commenced within the time limited thereon and
have been terminated in a manner other than a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final
judgment on the merits. This section has been held applicable to
actions for wrongful death.6
Section 24 of the Act, which deals with the effect of a stay of
the commencement of the action, has not been construed in connec116 Minn. 461, 134 N. W. 111 (1912).
Hoffman v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 163 App. Div. 50, 148 N. Y. Supp.
509 (3d Dep't 1914)-construing § 405 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure which is now § 23 of the New York Civil Practice Act. See also Boffe
v. Consolidated Telegraph & El. Subway Co., 171 App. Div. 392, 157 N. Y.
Supp. 318 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd mem., 226 N. Y. 654, 123 N. E. 856 (1919).
62
63
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tion with the death statutes. On the basis of the construction given
to other limitational exceptions it would seem to be applicable to
death actions should a proper situation arise.
The second category of exceptions to the general statutes of
limitations are those which apply because of some personal disability
accruing to the plaintiff. In this regard Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act is of utmost importance. This section provides that the
general statutes of limitations may be extended because of the insanity, imprisonment for a crime for a term less than life, or infancy
of the party to whom the right of action accrued. The maximum time
allowed as an extension varies with each of the disabilities but a
consideration of such technicalities will not be important for our
purposes unless it is finally determined that the disabilities mentioned
will extend the period of limitation governing the action for wrongful
death. The disabilities of insanity and imprisonment have not been
judicially construed in connection with the wrongful death statutes.
Prima facie it would seem that such construction will never be required because neither an insane person or a prisoner would be appointed as personal representative of a decedent. However, a recent decision 64 enunciates the doctrine that the extension provisions
arising from disabilities run to the real party in interest rather than
the administratorad prosequendam. If this doctrine be sound then
we may well have construction of the insanity and imprisonment disability provisions in connection with a wrongful death action where
the disabled parties are in fact the real parties in interest. The
"real party in interest" doctrine will be considered in greater detail
at a later stage in this article.
The disability of infancy has been judicially construed with regard to its effect upon the period of limitation contained in the death
statutes. The problem is fully treated in Mossip v. F. H. Clement
& Co.65 In that case the administratrix was the decedent's widow.
She commenced the death action, after the two-year period had expired, solely for the benefit of the decedent's two minor children.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the cause of action did not accrue within the time limited by law
for the commencement of an action thereon. The plaintiff sought
to overcome the defendant's motion by reliance upon the infancy of
the next of kin for whose benefit the action was commenced. The
defendant's motion was granted. On appeal the Appellate Division
affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals also
affirmed the decision, but without opinion. The crux of the decision
was held to lie in the fact that Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act
64 Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corporation, 273 App. Div. 4, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 818

(1st Dep't 1947).
65 256 App. Div. 469, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 592 (4th Dep't 1939), aff'd mem.,
283 N. Y. 554, 27 N. E. 2d 278 (1940).
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permitting an extension of the general statutes of limitations where
the right of action accrued to an infant could not possibly apply to
the wrongful death action because under the death statutes the right
to maintain that action accrued to the personal representative of the
decedent and not to the parties for whose benefit the action was
commenced. Obviously under such construction the benefits of the
infancy provisions of Section 60 would never be applicable in death
actions because ati infait being unable to sue or be sued in his own
name could not be appointed as personal representative of the decedent. The decision is harsh and tends to circumvent the remedial
intent which prompted the enactment of the death statute.
Another personal disability is to be found in Section 27 of the
Civil Practice Act. This section provides that the effect of war on
the right of an enemy alien is to extend the period of limitation for
the commencement of actions accruing to said alien for the period
of the disability. A 1948 amendment to Section 13 of the Civil Practice Act has extended similar protection to those in enemy occupied
countries. There has been no construction of the provisions in connection with the death statutes. It should be noted that all of the
disabilities embodied in Sections 27"and 60 must exist as of the time
of the accrual of the cause of action. This requirement would make
the applicability of Section 27 to wrongful death actions unlikely
under our present laws because enemy aliens would not be appointed
as personal representatives of decedents by the Surrogate. 60
Thus far it has been indicated that in New York the period of
limitation governing the action for wrongful death is in its nature
akin to the general statutes of limitations. The exceptions to the
general statutes of limitations have been held to affect the period of
limitation in the death statutes in properly applicable situations.
Where the exception claimed involves a disability personal to the
party to whom the right of action accrues the courts have intimated
that unless the disability inures to the benefit of the personal representative in his representative capacity the exception is inapplicable.
These are basic factors in the analysis of the problem of the construction of the period limiting the remedy in wrongful death actions.
There are other factors which remain to be considered which affect
that problem in a very real sense.
In 1941 the Military Law of the State of New York was
amended to include a war measure-the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act.67 The provisions of this Act were intended to "maintain,
secure, and protect the civil and property rights of persons in the
military service." 68 The Act further elaborates upon that enuncia15N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 28. The disability must exist when the right

of action accrues.
67 N. Y. MiLiTARY
68 N. Y. MLaTARY

LAW §§ 300-323.
LAW § 300.
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tion of the public policy of the state by declaring that "all the provisions of this article shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of this purpose." 69 These statutes are similar to the current
Federal Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act 70 and the analogous
federal statutes enacted during the first world war which were binding
upon the courts of New York at that time.7 1 At the present writing
the Federal and New York Relief Acts are still in full force and effect.
Section 308 of the Military Law is a significant feature of the New
York Act. This section provides that the ". . period of military
service shall not be included in computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law for the bringing of any action by or
against any person in military service or by or against his heirs,
executors, administrators, or assigns, whether such cause of action
shall have accrued prior to or during the period of such service."
72
In Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corporation,
Section 308 of the
Military Law was construed in connection with an action for wrongful death. This decision is important because it may aid in an extension of the liberal construction principles which should be applicable to death actions. It is most appropriate therefore that this case
was decided in 1947-the year in which the State of New York observed the 100th anniversary of the enactment of its first death
statute.
The factual situation in the Stutz case is extremely interesting.
In March, 1943, the deceased was struck by a taxicab owned by the
defendant corporation and operated by its driver who was also a
named defendant in the action. The injuries inflicted were of such
a nature that death ensued in a matter of hours. The action was
brought by the personal representative of the decedent to recover
damages on two causes of action, i.e., for wrongful death and for the
personal injuries sustained by the decedent because of the alleged
.negligence of the defendants. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff administrator was the only child and sole next of kin of the deceased. The action was commenced in September, 1946, more than
three years from the date of the decedent's death. It was further
alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was in the service of the
Armed Forces of the United States during the period from May,
1942, to March, 1946. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action had not been brought within the
time limited by law for the commencement of the suit. The motion
was granted in the Supreme Court as to both the wrongful death
and personal injury claims. On appeal, the Appellate Division determined that in the light of Section 308 of the Military Law the
69 Ibid.
7054 STAT.

1178, 50 U. S. C. APP. §§ 501-590 (1940).

Erickson v. Macy, 231 N. Y. 86, 131 N. E. 744 (1921); Clark v.
Mechanic's American Nat. Bank, 282 Fed. 589 (C. C. A. 8th 1922).
72 See
72273

App. Div. 4, 8, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 818, 822 (1st Dep't 1947).
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action for wrongful death was commenced within the time limited
by law. The Supreme Court decision, thus modified, was affirmed
with regard to the personal injury claim.
The rationale of the Appellate Division in the Stutz case is
most impressive. The court recognized the fact that the action for
wrongful death exists solely for the benefit of the decedent's surviving spouse and next of kin, though, pro forma, the legal representative of the deceased is the party upon whom the statute confers the
right to maintain the action. It was indicated that the right to have
the personal representative of the deceased sue for wrongful death
is a property right of the beneficiary which becomes a part of the
beneficiary's estate if the latter dies prior to the recovery. Emphasis
is placed upon the fact that the administrator holds the proceeds of
the recovery in such action in trust for the "exclusive benefit of the
statutory distributees." 73 In the instant case the only beneficiary
of the trust was the plaintiff individually as the sole next of kin of
the decedent. Thus it was determined that the plaintiff in his individual capacity was the real party in interest in the action. Justice
Callahan, speaking for the court, expressed the view that since the
first cause of action in the complaint was one ". . . to compensate
the plaintiff individually as sole next of kin for his pecuniary loss
suffered through the negligent killing of the deceased ... it logically
follows that his rights as the real party in interest are protected by
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Acts, Military Law, § 308;
U. S. Code Tit. 50, Appendix, § 525, ... and that these statutes
serve to toll the statute of limitations with respect to the cause of
action for wrongful death during the time of his military service." 74
Following its determination that the tolling provisions of the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Acts inured to the benefit of the real party
in interest in the action the court concluded that the plaintiff, in his
representative capacity, could avail himself of the benefits which were
bestowed upon him in his individual capacity. The court did not
intimate that a different conclusion would result where the representative and the real party in interest were not one and the same
person. The dismissal of the complaint as to the personal injury
claim was affirmed by the Appellate Division. Since the right of
action for damages for the personal injuries sustained accrued to the
decedent in the first instance, the derivative action instituted by the
personal representative was for the benefit of the decedent's estate.
It was held that the decedent's estate could not lay claim to the benefits of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Acts on the "real party
in interest" theory. The court pointed out that in the personal injury claim the rights sought to be enforced are primarily those of
the decedent who was never in military service and that there
3Ibid.
74Ibid.
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"... is no warrant for extending the benefit of these statutes to the
deceased civilian or her estate as such." 7
Under the "real party in interest" doctrine it would seem that
the applicability of the personal disability tolling and extension provisions of the general statutes of limitations could be extended to
actions for wrongful death if the personal representative and the real
party in interest need not be one and the same person. Much depends, therefore, upon the effect that the Stutz decision will have
upon future judicial consideration of the problem. If that case is
to be treated as a singular' one, and consequently limited to its particular facts, no extension of the personal disability provisions of the
general statutes of limitations will ensue. If, on the other hand, the
"real party in interest" doctrine is extended to implement those disability provisions in death actions there remains a serious question
as to just how far the courts will go in effectuating such an extension
on the basis of the Stutz decision.
There were several salient side-issues raised by implication in
the Stutz case which the court found unnecessary to answer in the
course of its deliberation. For example, the court does not clearly
indicate what its determination might be if the real party in interest
and the administrator, or executor, who institutes an action for
wrongful death were not, in fact, the same person. Logically it
would appear reasonable that the court's conclusion should be the
same. A real party in interest is the owner of a claim.76 The decision does indicate that the beneficiary has a vested right to have
the personal representative of the decedent maintain the death action.
One who has such a right may fairly be termed the owner of a claim.
Under the Civil Practice Act, with certain specified exceptions, every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 77
One of the specified exceptions arises where the action is brought
by an executor or administrator.7 8 Therefore the fact that the action
is commenced by the personal representative of the decedent does not
preclude the existence of another who is really the party beneficially
interested in the successful prosecution of the action.
There is a second difficulty which arises out of the Stutz decision. It is to be remembered that the court in that case was faced
with a situation where the party who claimed the benefit of the tolling
provision was the sole next of kin of the decedent. The action for
wrongful death is generally recognized as a single action brought to
recover all of the damages which accrued to the surviving spouse and
all of the next of kin.79 If there is but one person entitled to such
recovery the implementation of a tolling provision does not pose any
75273 App. Div. 4, 10, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 818, 824 (1st Dep't 1947).
76

See PRAsHKER, NEW YORK PmaCTic

§ 153 (1947).

77 N. Y. CIV. PRac. AcT § 210.
78

Ibid.

79See Whitford v. The Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465, 470 (1861).
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difficulty with respect to the "single action" consideration. Where
one of several parties thus beneficially interested in the recovery
could claim the benefits of a tolling provision such as the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act a serious problem is presented. In practice that is the typical situation which would arise. Regrettably that
problem was not before the court, hence no solution of it is offered
in the Stutz case. If the party for whose benefit the tolling provision
inures seeks to compel the prosecution of the death action after the
period of limitations has barred the remedies of his co-beneficiaries
it would seem that the court might adopt any one of three courses
of action:
(1) The personal representatives might be permitted to
bring the action in behalf of all the parties beneficially interested. Such a course of action would, in effect, resurrect the
barred actions by judicial act. It is doubtful whether the courts
have the inherent power to accomplish such a resurrection."0
Moreover, even if the courts possessed the power, it is extremely unlikely that they would attempt to exercise it under
the circumstances.
(2) As a matter of policy the action might be held barred
as to all parties. It would appear that this course of action
would effect an arbitrary deprivation of the property right vested
in the party to whom the tolling provision inured. This procedure would avoid the problem of split causes of action but it
is questionable whether the courts would have the power or the
inclination to adopt it.
(3) The party claiming the benefit of the tolling provision
may be allowed to recover the damages for the pecuniary loss
resulting to him while the remedies of the co-beneficiaries are
to be deemed extinguished. Whether or not this procedure
would involve a splitting of the cause of action is a neat question. In New York a claimant may not split his entire and
indivisible claim and prosecute multiple actions thereon.81 With
regard to this rule there arises a further qualification to the
effect that the prosecution of the action for less than the full
amount of the damages collectable operates to make the whole
claim res judicata at the determination of the action.8 2 Under
s0 Apparently this power vests only in the legislature and then it is only
operative where vested rights to tangible properties are not involved. See
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 29 L. ed. 483 (1885).
s'lBendernagle v. Cocks, 19 Wend. 207, 215, 32 Am. Dec. 448 (N. Y.
1838); White v. Adler, 289 N. Y. 34, 44, 43 N. E. 2d 798, 803 (1942). For
a more
complete treatment, see PRAsHxER, NEW YORK PRAcricE § 140 (1947).
82 See Silberstein v. Begun, 232 N. Y. 319, 133 N. E. 904 (1922) ; PRASIMER,
NEW YoRK PRAcrncE § 140 (1947).
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this third alternative it is submitted that the court would not be
countenancing a split cause of action. It is true that the action
for wrongful death is a single action brought to recover the
damages accruing to all the next of kin. However, each party
thus beneficially interested has a vested right to have the personal representative bring the action.83 In reality the representative is prosecuting, in one action, as many claims as there
are next of kin entitled to recover. Where some of those remedies are barred the number of claims sought to be enforced are
reduced accordingly provided that the defendant raises the
proper objections. Where all the claims save one are thus extinguished the representative is prosecuting the action to enforce
the single claim. The net result in such a situation is to bring
the case within the scope of the Stutz decision. There is only
one action commenced-thus the problem of multiple suits is
avoided. In fact there never was one entire and indivisible
claim. The fact that the court's ultimate determination is res
judicata as to the rights of the other parties beneficially interested is of no great significance because those remedies were
already extinguished through the operation of the statute of
limitations. The result would not be otherwise if there were
more than one of several next of kin who could claim the benefit
of tolling provisions-the action would be to enforce their rights.
There might be some difficulty in computing the pro rata share
of the damages which must be paid to the successful representative as trustee for the party (or parties) beneficially interested
whose claim survived. That such a difficulty is not insurmount8 4 a New Hampshire deable is indicated in Halle v. Cavanaugh,
cision, which is analogous to the Stutz case. The New Hampshire court stated, "The suggestion is made that if the husband
(the party to whom the tolling provision inured) owns only a
part interest in the estate the result of allowing him to appear
and prosecute the suit would be to compel a complex computation to determine his ultimate net interest therein so that recovery should be limited accordingly. The question does not
now arise except incidentally and as a collateral test for the correctness of the conclusion that he can maintain the action ....
If the rule suggested is sound, it does not present an insuperable
obstacle. In any event, his share would have to be determined
before distribution and if that share is all that can be recovered,
and is in fact less than the whole, judgment on the verdict can

of Meekin v. B. H. Ry., 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50 (1900).
LAW § 130, whereby a husband or wife can compel
prosecution of the death action provided they are not to share in the decedent's
estate.
8479 N. H. 418, 111 Atl. 76 (1920).
83 Matter

See also N. Y. DEc. EsT.
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be postponed until the amount to which he is entitled is
determined." 85

Upon principle it thus appears that the aforementioned third
alternative course of action offers compelling reasons for its adoption
by the courts. While it was unnecessary to decide the issue in the
Stutz case, Justice Callahan, speaking for the court, declared, "We
appreciate that a case may arise where a serviceman is only one of
the next of kin and thus owns only a part of a claim for wrongful
death barred for lack of prosecution within the usual period of limitation. We need not determine the rule to be applied in a situation
of that kind. We have considered the possibility of such a case merely
as a collateral test for the correctness of our conclusion and find
it does not alter our view that the plaintiff may maintain this
suit on the cause of action for wrongful death. (See Halle v.
Cavanaugh ....)" 86 It would be fair to assume that had the issue
been squarely presented the court might have felt constrained to
adopt the third course of action suggested above.
Another issue in the Stutz v. GuardianCab Corporationdecision
arises out of the distinction which the Appellate Division makes between that case and the case of Mossip v. F. H. Clement Co. 87 The
court ignores the fact that the fundamental basis of the Mossip decision was that the tolling provision of Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act inured to the benefit of the decedent's next of kin who were
not permitted under the terminology of the death statutes to maintain the action. It was held that the action must be maintained by
the personal representative of the deceased. The person acting in
the representative capacity was not the party benefited by the operation of Section 60. Consequently the action was held to be barred
by the statute of limitations. In the Stutz case the court distinguishes the Mossip decision by saying with regard to that case, "It
was held that the provisions of Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act
excluding the disability of infancy from periods of limitation were
limited by the provisions of Section 10 of the Civil Practice Act
excepting a case where a different limitation is specially prescribed
by law. Inasmuch as the period of limitation in an action for wrongful death is 'specially prescribed by law under Section 130 of the
Decedent Estate Law, it was decided that the period of infancy of
the decedent's children was not to be excluded in computing the time
within which to bring the action. With respect to a person in the
military service, however, it is expressly provided that the limitation
85 79 N. H. 418, 111 AtI. 76, 78 (1920).
8 Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corporation, 273 App. Div. 4, 9, 74 N. Y. S.

2d

818, 823 (1st Dep't 1947).
87256 App. Div. 469, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 592 (4th Dep't 1939), aff'd mem.,
283 N. Y. 554, 27 N. E. 2d 278 (1940).
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of any law for bringing an action is tolled by the period of his military service." 88 It is submitted that the proposition for which the
court thus cites the Mossip case is purely dicta in that decision. The
theory that the period limiting the action for wrongful death is a
special period of limitation within the meaning of Section 10 of the
Civil Practice Act is not supported by the weight of authority in
New York. The majority of the cases dealing with the problem
hold that the only special periods of limitations within the meaning
of Section 10 are those which operate in the nature of a condition
precedent to the right of action.89
The Mossip case was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without
opinion. 0 The lack of a written opinion by the highest court of the
state did not have the effect of transforming the dicta of the lower
Appellate Court into the square holding of the case. Therefore,
under the precise holding of the Mossip case, unless the disability is
one which the personal representative can claim in his representative
capacity the court does not have to consider whether or not the provisions of Section 60 will operate in connection with an action for
wrongful death. This doctrine, while limited in application to personal disability exceptions to the general statutes of limitations as
construed in connection with the death statutes, is, nonetheless, diametrically opposed in theory and in principle to the "real party in
interest" doctrine as evidenced by the Stutz decision. Admittedly
the tolling provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Acts
are to be liberally construed. 91 It is also true that those provisions
are broader in scope than the tolling provisions encompassed in the
general statutes of limitations. If great weight is to be given to those
factors the "real party in interest" doctrine will not be extended
beyond the factual limitations of the Stutz decision. If this doctrine
is to be extended to apply to the personal disability exceptions to the
general statutes of limitations the Mossip case must be overruled.
The Court of Appeals or the legislature of the state are the bodies
with the authority and power to achieve such an end result.
The three basic problems which were left undecided in the Stutz
case have been considered. It is reasonably certain that the administrator and the real party in interest need not be the same person.
Furthermore, it is wholly logical to assume that the doctrine propounded in that decision will be applicable in situations where the
real party in interest in the action who claims the personal benefit
of a tolling provision is not the sole surviving next of kin. However, the Mossip case stands as a firm block in the path of an exten88273 App. Div. 4, 9, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 818, 823 (1st Dep't 1947).
89 See note 59 sulpra.
o283 N. Y. 554, 27 N. E. 2d 278 (1940).

03 N. Y. MILITARY LAW § 300; Parker v. State of New York, 185 Misc.
584, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 242 (Ct. of Claims 1945) ; Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S.
561, 575, 87 L. ed. 1587, 1596 (1943)--construing the Federal Act.
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sion of the "real party in interest" doctrine to Sections 27, 28 and
60 of the Civil Practice Act as construed in conjunction with actions
for wrongful death.
The Stutz case which construes the tolling provisions of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act is sound. It has long been
recognized that under the New York death statutes the administrator, though a necessary party, is a formal one.92 Many cases cite
with approval the doctrine that the right to have the decedent's personal representative institute the action for wrongful death was a
property right which vested in the beneficiaries. 93 The rule that the
administrator receives the pecuniary damages recovered as trustee
for the surviving spouse and next of kin is fundamental in the law.9 4
The fact that the tolling provision under consideration was to be
liberally construed is not too significant because it would, by its very
terms, operate to toll "any law" be it a mere statute of limitations
or a condition precedent to the right of action.95 The outstanding
feature of the case is the liberality with which the court construed
the salient provisions of the death statute. By advancing the trust
theory one step further the "real party in interest" doctrine was declared and the remedial nature of the action for wrongful death was
given full effect.
The Mossip decision, on the other hand, is strict and harsh.
There are declarations in the Civil Practice Act to the effect that
the provisions of the Act "shall be liberally construed," 96 and that
"The rule of the common law that a statute in derogation of the
common law is to be strictly construed does not apply to this Act." 97
The period of limitation governing the action for wrongful death
had been construed to be a mere statute of limitations. 8 The exceptions which tolled the general statutes of limitations where the action
itself was affected were applied without question to death actions on
many occasions.9 9 The strict holding of the Mossip case was not
92

Central N. Y. Coach Lines v. Syracuse Herald Co., 277 N. Y. 110, 13
N. E. 2d 599 (1938) ; Davis v. N. Y. C. & H. Ry., 233 N. Y. 242, 135 N. E.

27793(1922).
Matter of Meekin v. B. H. Ry., 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50 (1900). See
also, Doyle v. New York 0. & W. -Ry., 66 App. Div. 398, 72 N. Y. Supp. 936
(4th Dep't 1901), wherein it was held that the next of kin can validly and
bindingly settle the cause of action without resort to the services of the
administrator.
94
Hamilton v. Erie Ry., 219 N. Y. 343, 114 N. E. 399 (1916). See also
N. Y. DEC. Esr. LAW § 133.

95 N. Y. MniTARY LAW § 308.
96 N. Y. Civ. PRua Acr §2.
9 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 3. It is to be noted that this same provision

was formerly § 3345 of the now extant New York Code of Civil Procedure.
98 Sh rrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N. Y. 101, 108 N. E. 217 (1915).
99 For example: Kerr v. St. Luke's Hospital, 176 Misc. 610, 28 N. Y. S.
2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd mrem., 262 App. Div. 822, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 141

(1st Dep't 1941), aff'd rmein., 287 N. Y. 673, 39 N. E. 2d 291 (1941)-§ 17;
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consonant with the liberal construction rules applicable to the sections of the Civil Practice Act. The dictum of the court to the effect
that Section 10 of the Civil Practice Act precluded the application
of Section 60, of the same Act, to the action for wrongful death because the latter was governed by a limitation especially prescribed
by law is not consistent with the construction given to other tolling
provisions in connection with death actions.' 00 The doctrine that
the benefits of Section 60 could not possibly be considered to extend to death actions unless the benefit first ran to the plaintiffadministratrik in her representative capacity amounted to a conclusion that Section 60 could never apply to such actions because a party
who was thus disabled could not be appointed as personal representative of a deceased person. Patently, the Mossip case negates
the remedial aspects of the statutory action for wrongful death. It
arbitrarily placed the minor children of the deceased beneath the
cloud of the common law rule. An alleged tortfeasor was rendered
immune from liability without a fair determination of innocence or
guilt. It is true that the claim should be litigated within a reasonable
time-however, under the facts of the instant case greater liberality
in construing both the Civil Practice Act and the death statutes
would not have intolerably prejudiced the defendant. The court's
ultimate determination cannot be viewed as a glowing triumph of
justice.
The statutory cause of action for wrongful death is essentially
remedial in nature. The statutes encompassing that right should be
liberally construed. Mr. Justice Cardozo, considering wrongful death
statutes generally, wrote graphically on the construction problem in
Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co.,' 0 1 wherein he declared, "Death
statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the
law . :. . It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process
of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to
be remedied. There are times when uncertain words are to be
wrought into consistency and unity with a legislative policy which is
itself a source of law, a new generative impulse transmitted to the
legal system. 'The Legislature has the power to decide what the
policy of the law shall be and if it has intimated its will, however
indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed.' (Quoting
from Holmes, Circuit Justice, in Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed.
30, 32.)" 102
With regard to the problem of the construction to be afforded
the period of limitation governing the action for wrongful death it
Hoffman v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 163 App. Div. 50, 148 N. Y. Supp. 509
(3d Dep't 1914)-§ 23.
100 See note 59 supra.

101300 U. S. 342, 81 L. ed. 685 (1937).

For the New York affirmation of this doc102 Id. at 350, 81 L. ed. at 690.
trine, consider Greco v. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938).
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has been noted that the principal factors affecting that problem, the
death statutes, the Civil Practice Act, and the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act, are all to be liberally construed. It follows logically that similar construction is to be afforded those factors when
considered in conjunction with the period limited by law for the
commencement of the death action. Much progress has been made
by the courts of New York with respect to such construction. The
treatment of the period of limitation in the death statutes as a mere
statute of limitations was a major step in effectuating the remedial
nature of that statutory cause of action. The application of tolling
provisions of the general statutes of limitations which affect the cause
of action to the period of limitation in the death action was another
progressive milestone. The doctrine of the Mossip case marked a
detour and a backward step which should be rectified. The development of the "real party in interest" theory in the Stutz case points
the way toward the elimination of the Mossi doctrine with a resultant extension of the personal disability tolling provisions of the
general statutes of limitations to actions for wrongful death.
From a particularized analysis of a single phase of the death
action it has been possible to observe the general trend of judicial
construction of all aspects of that statutory cause of action. It is
submitted that the courts of New York have made noteworthy progress in extending the effectiveness of the death statutes. The indicated trend shows that a liberal construction policy will continue to
be followed by those courts within the sound dictates of reason and
possibility.
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CiARITABLE TRUSTS FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES

Recently, an English appellate court decided that a gift in trust
for a Carmelite convent was not for a charitable purpose.' The
court held that public benefit was a necessary element even where
the trust is for the advancement of religion. The Carmelites are a
cloistered order, and they engage in no exterior material works such
as teaching or care of the sick. The court said that the nuns applied
themselves to being good, not to doing good, and that the purpose
of the gift was not sufficient as to constitute a charity.
The obvious argument that would occur to anyone familiar
with religious organizations such as the Carmelites is that the court
,in re Coats' Trusts (Coats v. Gilmour), W. N. 103, Mar. 20, 1948.

